New legal study raises questions about Kingdom's responsibility to protect human rights in St. Maarten

GREAT BAY--A new scholarly examination of the Kingdom of the Netherlands' responsibility to safeguard human rights has raised important constitutional questions for St. Maarten, particularly concerning whether the Kingdom's obligations begin only when serious failures occur or extend to helping autonomous countries prevent those failures in the first place.
The study, published on November 10, 2026, in the Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht (Journal of Constitutional Law), was written by constitutional law researcher Tycho Scholten of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Titled De verantwoordelijkheid van het Koninkrijk voor het waarborgen van mensenrechten, it revisits Article 43, paragraph 2, of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, one of the central provisions governing the relationship between the Kingdom and its autonomous Caribbean countries.
Scholten's analysis is particularly relevant to St. Maarten because it addresses a recurring tension in Kingdom relations: how to reconcile the constitutional autonomy of Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten with the Kingdom's ultimate responsibility for safeguarding fundamental human rights.
Under Article 43, each country is primarily responsible for protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, legal certainty and good governance within its own jurisdiction. The second paragraph assigns responsibility for safeguarding those principles to the Kingdom.
What that second responsibility requires in practice has been debated for decades.

Must the Kingdom wait until something goes wrong?
Traditionally, the Kingdom's safeguarding responsibility has been interpreted largely as a last resort. Under this approach, intervention becomes an option when an autonomous country is unable or unwilling to correct a serious failure itself.
Scholten examines that interpretation alongside the more cooperative approach developed by the Council of State of the Kingdom, which recognizes that preventing problems through assistance and collaboration can be more effective than intervention after circumstances have deteriorated.
He goes further by examining whether Article 43 establishes a responsibility extending across the relevant institutions of the Kingdom, rather than being confined to the Kingdom government exercising its formal supervisory powers.
In Scholten's interpretation, safeguarding human rights should not be understood exclusively as the ability to intervene. It can also involve the appropriate use of existing legal powers, administrative influence, cooperation and institutional support to help autonomous governments meet their responsibilities.
Importantly, his argument does not automatically confer new powers on Kingdom institutions or propose removing responsibilities from the Caribbean countries. He maintains that institutions must operate within their legally established authority.
The central issue is whether those institutions can also be held politically accountable for what they do, or fail to do, to support the effective protection of fundamental rights.
St. Maarten's prison situation provides a direct example
For St. Maarten, the relevance of Scholten's argument is demonstrated by the country's longstanding detention problems.
In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights found that detention conditions in a St. Maarten police facility violated the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment in the Corallo case.
A year later, the Court of First Instance of St. Maarten ruled that conditions at Point Blanche Prison violated Article 3 of the country's Constitution, referring to longstanding violence and structural insecurity within the facility.
These circumstances were subsequently examined by the Council of State of the Kingdom in its 2024 advisory report marking 70 years of the Charter.
The Council observed that although serious deficiencies had persisted, the Kingdom government ultimately chose not to exercise its formal intervention powers. Instead, cooperation between St. Maarten and the Netherlands developed through financial and technical assistance, including support for detention improvements, personnel training and plans for a new prison.
The Council presented this experience as an example of why cooperation can be more appropriate than direct intervention when dealing with complex and longstanding institutional problems.
Scholten draws on that analysis to support his broader examination of how the safeguarding responsibility should function.
The example raises a question directly relevant to St. Maarten: If a country's institutions face persistent difficulties meeting their human rights obligations, should assistance from Kingdom institutions be viewed solely as cooperation between autonomous partners, or also as part of the Kingdom's own responsibility to safeguard those rights?
Scholten's reasoning provides grounds for considering both dimensions together.

A broader understanding of responsibility
The study was prompted by another European Court of Human Rights judgment, delivered on April 21, 2026, concerning the detention of seven Venezuelan migrants in Curaçao.
The Court found violations involving the ability to challenge detention, as well as disproportionate force used against three detainees and the failure to conduct an independent investigation. The judgment was delivered against the Kingdom of the Netherlands, reflecting its responsibility under international law.
That case illustrates another problem Scholten examines: the Kingdom can be held internationally accountable for violations occurring within an autonomous Caribbean country, even though the relevant government services fall primarily under that country's jurisdiction.
He argues that the internal allocation of constitutional responsibilities must be understood in a manner that allows international human rights obligations to be fulfilled.
His analysis therefore examines the responsibilities not only of the Kingdom government, but also of other Kingdom institutions capable of contributing through their existing powers and functions.
As for St. Maarten, this approach could inform discussions about judicial protection, detention standards and the capacity of public institutions to meet obligations arising from human rights treaties.
It also presents a different way of evaluating cooperation between St. Maarten and the Netherlands. Rather than looking exclusively at whether assistance was requested or provided, attention could also be directed toward whether Kingdom institutions have adequately supported the conditions necessary for St. Maarten to fulfil its responsibilities.
This is an application of Scholten's broader constitutional reasoning, not a finding by him that particular St. Maarten institutions have failed in those areas.
Why the Curaçao–El Salvador agreement has renewed the discussion
The publication has attracted attention amid Curaçao's decision to sign a non-binding declaration of intent with El Salvador concerning cooperation in criminal justice, policing, migration management and related areas.
That agreement has generated questions because of international criticism of human rights violations associated with El Salvador's security policies.
However, Scholten's publication does not examine the agreement with El Salvador, nor does it conclude that Curaçao has exceeded its constitutional authority.
The connection lies in the wider question of how autonomous responsibilities, international cooperation and the Kingdom's obligation to safeguard fundamental rights interact.
Under the Charter, foreign relations are a Kingdom responsibility, while considerable areas of justice policy remain within the authority of the individual countries. The legal implications of particular international arrangements depend on their content and character.
Scholten's research offers a framework for examining these responsibilities, but it should not be read as a legal judgment on Curaçao's agreement.

A question of autonomy and accountability
For St. Maarten, the significance of the study lies in its treatment of autonomy and Kingdom responsibility as obligations that can operate alongside one another.
Local autonomy remains fundamental. St. Maarten's government is responsible for managing its institutions and protecting the rights of people within its jurisdiction.
At the same time, Scholten challenges the assumption that the Kingdom's safeguarding responsibility is adequately fulfilled simply by retaining the power to intervene when circumstances become intolerable.
His analysis suggests that an effective constitutional framework should also allow scrutiny of how Kingdom institutions use their existing opportunities to assist, advise, coordinate and strengthen the capacity of autonomous countries.
This does not resolve the political sensitivities surrounding Kingdom involvement, nor does it eliminate the need to respect the constitutional authority of St. Maarten.
It does, however, place greater emphasis on prevention and shared responsibility rather than waiting for institutional failures to require extraordinary measures.
The underlying question of Scholten's study deserves consideration by policymakers in both Philipsburg and The Hague: How can the Kingdom fulfil its responsibility to safeguard fundamental rights while strengthening, rather than diminishing, St. Maarten's ability to exercise its own constitutional responsibilities?
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