BTP’s 2017 mandate for GEBE was not the same as 2026: This time, it appears to have teeth

GREAT BAY--ACP-SXM has raised a question that many consumers will find reasonable: if BTP was given a role connected to GEBE oversight as far back as 2017, what exactly was done between then and now?

It is a fair question. After years of billing disputes, fuel clause confusion, rising public frustration and weak consumer confidence, the public has a right to ask whether institutions that were assigned responsibilities actually carried them out. ACP-SXM’s request for an accountability report from BTP is therefore not without value. But the issue is more complicated than ACP-SXM’s framing suggests.

The central question is not only whether BTP had a mandate in 2017. The more important question is what kind of mandate BTP had, what legal power came with it, and whether GEBE was actually required to obey BTP at the time. In reality, the 2017 and 2020 decrees appear to have given BTP work to do, but not the legal enforcement power needed to compel GEBE to open its books, hand over operational data, justify its fuel clause or comply with supervisory instructions.

In plain language, BTP had an assignment. It did not yet have the teeth and that is where ACP-SXM’s position becomes incomplete. It is not wrong to ask what BTP did from 2017 onward. But it is too simple to suggest that BTP had the same power then that it has now. The available legal pathway shows a clear difference between preparatory work and enforceable supervision.

The deeper story begins with GEBE’s concession.

In 2010, GEBE was granted a 25-year concession to operate St. Maarten’s electricity system. That concession was a binding public-corporate arrangement that placed obligations on GEBE in exchange for the right to operate the country’s electricity system. Under that concession, GEBE was required to submit five-year rolling multi-year plans every year. Those plans were supposed to include income and expenses, maintenance schedules, investment plans, grid capacity, renewable energy development, safety programs and future demand analysis.

The concession also required GEBE to increase renewable energy and reach at least two percent by 2015. It required GEBE to meet quality standards, measured quarterly, with the possibility of fines for failure. It required tariff structure proposals to be submitted six months before implementation. It required GEBE to operate in a way that reflected economic reality and national energy policy, with sustainability visible in its decisions.

But those tools were apparently never activated in a meaningful way. No multi-year plans were approved. Renewable energy targets were not enforced. No fines were issued. Tariff structure reviews were not demanded in a way that changed the system. No effective supervisory mechanism was activated.

The discussion raised by ACP has focused heavily on BTP’s 2017 mandate, but the larger failure appears to be that government after government did not use the concession tools that already existed. The concession contained consumer protection mechanisms, planning obligations, tariff controls and renewable energy requirements. Yet for roughly 15 years, those mechanisms sat unused. That shifts part of the blame away from the idea that BTP simply failed to act on its own. BTP could not enforce what government had not legally empowered it to enforce.

The 2017 Ministerial Decree gave BTP a mandate related to GEBE and the utilities sector. ACP-SXM is correct to point that out. The decree instructed BTP to study renewable energy, study tariffs, study efficiency, prepare a regulatory framework and report quarterly. It also included work related to tariff regulation, energy efficiency, renewable energy feasibility, offshore wind and photovoltaic projects, geothermal cooperation with Saba and St. Eustatius, interconnection policy and reverse metering for households.

But the 2017 decree did not appear to give BTP direct legal authority over GEBE. It did not require GEBE to hand over data. It did not tie BTP’s work directly to the enforcement of the electricity concession. It did not create a penalty mechanism if GEBE refused to cooperate. It did not turn BTP into an inspectorate with the power to compel compliance.

BTP may have been told to prepare a regulatory framework, but GEBE, as an independent public limited liability company, still operated with corporate autonomy. A ministerial decree could not simply override national legislation or the company’s legal position under corporate law. Without an active statutory supervisory role connected to the concession, BTP could ask questions, study models and prepare advice, but it could not necessarily force GEBE to surrender sensitive financial, operational or tariff data.

That is why the 2017 mandate can be described as oversight in a political or administrative sense, but not as full oversight in the enforceable legal sense. The 2020 decree did not fundamentally solve that problem. It renewed or continued the same kind of preparatory mandate.

If BTP requested internal financial models, audited statements, fuel clause breakdowns or operational data before 2026, GEBE could have resisted by relying on its corporate autonomy and the absence of a clear enforcement mechanism. Without a binding supervisory designation under the Electricity Concession Ordinance, BTP’s position was weak.

The 2026 Joint Ministerial Decree is much stronger

Ministerial Decree No. 806/2026, jointly issued by the Ministers of TEATT and VROMI, appears to have changed the legal relationship between BTP and GEBE. For the first time, BTP was formally designated as Supervisor under the Electricity Concession Ordinance. This is the key difference.

Under the 2026 decree, BTP is now supervising. That means GEBE is legally required to provide operational and financial data, submit its multi-year plans, justify its fuel clause calculations, comply with renewable energy obligations and meet quality standards.

The 2026 decree appears to activate the missing supervisory mechanism that previous governments failed to use. By anchoring BTP’s role directly in the Electricity Concession Ordinance and the concession structure, government has moved BTP from a preparatory role into an enforceable supervisory role.

For the first time, GEBE is being asked for data it cannot simply ignore. For the first time, BTP is positioned to demand compliance under the concession. For the first time, tariff structures and fuel clause calculations are being treated as matters for independent verification. For the first time, renewable energy obligations are being treated as legal duties rather than distant policy goals.

That does not mean BTP should be shielded from questions. It does mean the public should understand the difference between a weak preparatory mandate and a legally activated supervisory role. That is why the accusation that BTP “had oversight since 2017” needs refinement. BTP had a mandate since 2017, but that mandate did not necessarily amount to enforceable oversight over GEBE. It was a preparatory role, not the full supervisory authority now created under the 2026 decree.

With BTP formally designated as Supervisor, GEBE’s corporate shield is no longer the same obstacle. GEBE’s exclusive right to operate the electricity system comes with obligations. Once those obligations are actively supervised under the concession framework, GEBE can be required to provide the information needed to assess fuel clause calculations, tariff methodology, operational performance, investment planning and renewable energy compliance.

This is where the government of St. Maarten, ACP-SXM and BTP may actually be closer than the public debate suggests. The aforementioned parties want accountability, tariff transparency, independent verification of fuel clause adjustments, enforcement of GEBE’s multi-year planning obligations, renewable energy compliance and better communication with the public.

BTP’s current supervisory mandate, if properly executed, is the mechanism that can deliver those objectives.

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