Drayer: Curaçao is applying double standards in monetary union debate
WILLEMSTAD/PHILIPSBURG--An opinion piece by Journalist Dick Drayer has added a new layer to the growing debate over the future of the monetary union between Curaçao and St. Maarten, arguing that Curaçao’s current position reflects a troubling inconsistency in how it applies the principle of equality in constitutional and governance matters.
In the piece, titled “Curaçao applies double standards in debate on monetary union,” and published by Curacao.nu, Drayer argues that the dispute is no longer only a technical disagreement over governance at the Central Bank of Curaçao and St. Maarten, but has become a broader matter of principle involving consistency, credibility, and constitutional fairness.
According to the article, Prime Minister Gilmar Pisas, also on behalf of Minister Charles Cooper, is seriously considering withdrawing Curaçao from the monetary union with St. Maarten because of an administrative conflict over who has the authority to appoint the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank.
Drayer states that Curaçao’s position is based on the view that the current governance arrangement is unfair because equal appointment rights do not reflect what it sees as an unequal economic reality. With Curaçao holding approximately 80 percent of the economic interest in the Central Bank, the article says Curaçao believes it should have a greater say in decision-making.
The opinion piece takes issue with that reasoning, describing it as inconsistent with the stance Curaçao has often taken toward the Netherlands. Drayer argues that when the Netherlands seeks to intervene in response to governance concerns, Curaçaoan leaders frequently invoke the principle of equality among the countries of the Kingdom and reject such interference as inappropriate and harmful to autonomy.
In that context, the article says, arguments based on financial weight or superior contribution are often rejected as contrary to the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Yet, Drayer contends, Curaçao now appears willing to use a similar argument when dealing with St. Maarten.
The article further argues that the statute governing the Central Bank does not provide any legal basis for converting economic inequality into administrative dominance. According to Drayer, the fact that Curaçao holds a larger asset interest, roughly 80 percent compared to St. Maarten’s 20 percent, was known from the beginning and is relevant only in the event of a possible asset distribution upon dissolution.
He maintains that this does not create a basis for greater power within the monetary union or over financial supervision, and that the structure of the union is founded on equivalence between the two countries rather than on proportional economic strength.
Drayer concludes that any attempt to distribute power inside the union according to economic capacity would undermine the very foundation of the arrangement. He further argues that taking that position would also weaken Curaçao’s moral authority to continue defending the principle of equality in its relationship with the Netherlands.
In the final analysis, the article suggests that equality appears to be treated as a principle when Curaçao is dealing with the stronger Netherlands, but not when it is dealing with the weaker St. Maarten.
The opinion piece has added further weight to an already intensifying discussion over the future of the monetary union, while also raising broader questions about constitutional consistency and the political principles being advanced by the parties involved.
Why the “might is right” approach is
wrong, and why it cannot stand legally
(𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘪𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘺 𝘋𝘳𝘢𝘺𝘦𝘳)
Growing commentary surrounding the future of the monetary union between Curaçao and St. Maarten is drawing attention to what some observers describe as a long-standing “might is right” approach, one rooted in the belief that greater economic weight should translate into greater political and administrative power.
The issue has taken on renewed importance in the current debate over the governance of the Central Bank and the wider future of the monetary union. At the center of the concern is the argument that because Curaçao carries the larger share of the economic stake, it should also enjoy greater influence within the joint structure.
Analysts warn that such a position is not only politically troubling, but also difficult to defend in law.
They note that the principle underlying a monetary union is not domination by the stronger partner, but shared governance based on agreed rules. In that context, economic size by itself does not automatically create a legal right to superior authority. A larger financial interest may have relevance in very limited circumstances, such as asset distribution if a union is dissolved, but it does not by itself create a standing right to dominate decision-making within the union.
The broader concern being raised is that once raw economic weight becomes the measure of power, the very idea of equality between constituent countries begins to erode. What is presented as practicality can quickly become a hierarchy, one in which the smaller partner is expected to accept less influence simply because it is smaller.
Observers say this concern is not new. During the former Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao was often viewed by the smaller islands as the center of authority and administration, a place where economic and institutional size too often translated into political overreach. For many, the present dispute revives that old discomfort and feeds the perception that constitutional equality is being treated as flexible depending on who holds the stronger hand.
Joint structures are governed by their founding arrangements and by the constitutional principles that support them. If those arrangements are based on equivalence, then one side cannot simply claim additional authority later on because its economy is larger. If a country wants a different balance of power, the proper route is renegotiation through law and agreement, not the assumption that size alone creates entitlement.
The same principle of equality that Caribbean countries invoke in defending their autonomy within the Kingdom must also be respected in relations among themselves. If equality is treated as essential when dealing with a stronger partner, but ignored when dealing with a weaker one, that weakens the credibility of the argument itself.
A “might is right” approach is therefore wrong on both principle and law. It undermines trust, weakens partnership, and turns a shared structure into a contest of leverage rather than a framework of agreed rights and responsibilities.
For St. Maarten, the concern goes beyond the Central Bank dispute itself. It touches on a larger constitutional question: whether equality between countries is a real principle that holds in difficult moments, or merely a useful argument raised when convenient.
Those advancing this analysis argue that if equality is to mean anything, it must apply not only in relations with larger external powers, but also within the Caribbean part of the Kingdom itself. Otherwise, what remains is not partnership, but power dressed up as constitutional reasoning.